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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
A RECENT DEVELOPMENT WHICH CLARIFIES
THE LAW IN REGARD TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH
By
EDWARD H. MILLER*
Even after the entry of the United States into World War II this nation had
no definite legal theory with which to draw the line between those utterances
that are permissible exercise of the right of freedom of speech and those utter-
ances that could be curbed by the government on the theory that they jeopardized
our national security. (See The Case of Civil Liberties v. National Security. Dick-
inson Law Review, January, 1943, Vol. XLVII, No. 2.)
The two conflicting views on this subject were, first, the view of Justice
Holmes that, "The question in every case is whether the words used are in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantial evils that Congress has a right to prevent".'
The second test is of long standing and was applied in an outstanding 1920 case.2
This second test is known as the "indirect causation" or "reasonable tendency"
test. By this is meant that if any utterance indirectly causes, or has a reasonable
tendency to cause, a threat to national security, it can therefore be curtailed. Ob-
viously the latter restricts freedom of speech to a greater extent than the former.
The case of Terminiello v. Chicago, U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions,
Vol. 93, No. 15, decided May 16, 1949, is interesting both because it apparently
clears up the question of which one of the above two tests is to be the accepted one,
and also, intrinsically, because of the reasoning of the court in the majority opinion
and the contrasting reasoning in the three dissenting opinions, the court having
split five to four. The majority opinion, including a statement of facts, covered
slightly more than two pages in the Advance Opinions but Justice Jackson's separate
dissent covered twelve pages.
The facts, briefly stated, are that Father Terminiello, a Catholic priest under
suspension by his Bishop, delivered an address under the auspices of the Christian
Veterans of America to an overflow crowd in Chicago. A crowd of one thousand
people gathered in the streets outside of the hall and a cordon of police was as-
signed to keep order but, despite this fact, several disturbances broke out. Termin-
iello, after a jury trial, was found guilty of violating an ordinance of the City of
Chicago, providing that "All persons who shall make .. . any improper noise,
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1 Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919).
2 Pierce v. U. S., 252 U. S. 239, 40 Sup. Ct. 205 (1920).
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riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace
... shall be guilty of disorderly conduct .. " His conviction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Illinois.8
In reversing this conviction Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, said
that "the statutory words 'breach of the peace' were defined in instructions to the
jury to include speech which 'stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about
a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance . . .' ". Continuing, he pointed out
the error in these instructions by stating that "the vitality of civil and political in-
stitutions in our society depends on free discussion" and that "it is only through
free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people
and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity
of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart
from the totalitarian regimes . . . A function of free speech . is to invite dis-
pute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger ... "
"That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute . . . is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a
clear and present danger (italics supplied by the author) of a serious substantive
evil that rises far above public convenience, annoyance, or unrest."
Justice Jackson's dissent merits reading in its entirety. In it he combined
philosophy, psychology, Greek proverbs, "old proverbs", "Mein Kampf", quota-
tions from Joseph Goebbels, quotations from Woodrow Wilson and quotations
from Terminiello's speech, with his own reasoning.
In the latter classification is his statement that "this court seems to regard
these (order and liberty) as enemies of each other and to be of the view that we
must forego order to achieve liberty. So it fixes its eyes on a conception of freedom
of speech so rigid as to tolerate no concession to society's need for public order."
Justice Jackson's view of the charge in question was that it stated, for all
practical intents and purposes, "that if this particular speech added fuel to the
situation already so inflamed as to threaten to get beyond police control, it could
be punished as inducing a breach of the peace." Later in this dissent we find
the following quotation: "Where an offense is induced by speech, the Court has
laid down and often reiterated a test of the power of the authorities to deal with
the speaking as also an offense. 'The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger (Italics supplied by Justice Jackson) that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress ... has a right to prevent'."
3 Terminiello v. Chicago, 400 I11 23, 79 NE 2d 39.
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Thus, seeing both the majority and minority opinions applying the same test,
it seems to be an irrefutable conclusion from this case that this, the "clear and
present danger test", is the proper test to be applied in order to determine the
validity of any abridgment of our freedom of speech. This choice seems to be in
accord with our conception of civil liberty since it is not hard to imagine the
"reasonable tendency" or "indirect causation" test placing a too tight rein on one
of our cherished basic freedoms, curbing our liberty even before any danger from
its free exercise becomes actually apparent. As Americans we have come to feel
that what wt do and say shall be dictated only when it is proven to be necessary
exercise of the police power of the state and not because their free exercise may
have a "tendency" to work some undesirable result. Such a cure might be worse
than the disease.
